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STACKING	THE	ODDS	AGAINST	VARIABLE	EQUITABLE	INTERESTS	IN	THE	FAMILY	HOME 	Ms	Jones	and	Mr	Kernott	were	an	unmarried	couple	whose	purchase	of	a	house	in	1985	generated	a	dispute	that	has	(thus	far)	reached	the	Court	of	Appeal.	The	parties	acquired	the	property	in	joint	names,	apparently	unaware	of	the	legal	consequences	of	doing	so.	Everybody	agreed	that	the	parties	held	the	property	beneficially	in	equal	shares	when	they	separated	in	1993.	That	consensus	is	unsurprising	given	Stack	v.	Dowden	[2007]	UKHL	17,	[2007]	2	A.C.	432,	and	its	invocation	of	a	presumption	that	equity	follows	the	law	where	there	is	no	express	declaration	of	trust	and	a	common	intention	constructive	trust	is	asserted	in	a	domestic	context.	The	dispute	in	Jones	v.	Kernott	was	generated	by	Ms	Jones’s	continued	occupation	of	the	property	(with	the	couple’s	two	children)	after	separation	and	her	assumption	of	sole	responsibility	for	the	mortgage	and	other	outgoings	during	that	period.	Only	in	2006	did	Mr	Kernott	formally	seek	payment	of	his	half	share.	By	the	time	he	purported	to	sever	the	joint	tenancy	in	2008,	Ms	Jones	had	already	instituted	proceedings	asserting	the	existence	of	an	“am-	bulatory”	constructive	trust	by	virtue	of	an	unarticulated	agreement	that	the	property	was	no	longer	held	in	equal	shares	by	the	date	of	the	hearing,	such	that	she	now	owned	the	entire	beneficial	interest.	 There	is	ambiguity	as	regards	the	means	by	which	a	litigant	can	legitimately	rebut	the	Stack	presumption.	One	aspect	of	that	question	(confused	by	the	majority’s	indiscriminate	terminological	usage	in	Stack)	is	whether	a	court	can	impute	a	common	intention	to	the	parties	(rather	than	simply	infer	that	such	an	intention	existed).	This	would	involve	attributing	to	the	parties	an	intention	that	they	may	not	actu-	ally	have	held.	 In	the	County	Court,	Judge	Dedman	decided	that	the	property	should	be	divided	as	to	90%	for	Ms	Jones	and	10%	for	Mr	Kernott.	While	examining	the	whole	course	of	dealings	between	the	parties	in	relation	to	the	property	in	order	to	establish	their	common	intention	regarding	its	ownership,	purporting	to	apply	both	Oxley	v.	Hiscock	[2004]	EWCA	Civ	546,	[2005]	Fam.	211	and	Stack,	the	judge	was	in-	fluenced	by	the	fact	that	Ms	Jones	had	received	no	contribution	from	Mr	Kernott	towards	the	mortgage	and	little	towards	the	children’s	upbringing	for	14	years.	Indeed,	until	2006,	he	concluded,	Mr	Kernott	had	shown	no	intention	of	availing	himself	of	any	beneficial	interest	in	the	property.	 Mr	Kernott’s	appeal	to	the	High	Court	was	dismissed	([2009]	EWHC	1713	(Ch),	[2010]	1	All	E.R.	947).	Deputy	Judge	Nicholas	Strauss	Q.C.	held	that,	following	Stack,	the	court	was	free	to	impute	a	common	intention,	and	that	where	the	parties’	intention	could	not	be	deduced	from	words	or	conduct,	imputation	was	likely	to	depend	on	the	court	relying	on	what	it	considered	to	be	fair.	 The	Court	of	Appeal	([2010]	EWCA	Civ	578,	[2010]	1	W.L.R.	2401)	reversed	the	judgment	below	and	held	that	the	parties	shared	the	property	equally	in	equity.	Wall	L.J.	concentrated	on	the	question	whether	the	property	was	still	held	in	equal	shares,	rather	than	the	precise	allocation	of	interests	if	it	was	not.	He	held	that	the	Court’s	previous	decision	in	Oxley	(concerning	a	property	held	in	the	sole	name	of	one	party)	provided	“a	platform”	that	could	facilitate	the	dismissal	of	this	appeal,	because	of	its	emphasis	on	fairness	given	the	whole	course	of	dealing	between	the	parties	(at	[31]).	The	key	question	was	whether	the	House	of	Lords’	subsequent	decision	in	Stack,	which	em-	phasised	common	intention	rather	than	the	court’s	view	of	fairness,	necessitated	a	different	approach.	Wall	L.J.	felt	compelled	to	start	from	Baroness	Hale’s	contention	that	a	conveyance	into	joint	names	at	law	meant	joint	beneficial	interests	except	in	unusual	circumstances.	Given	that	premise,	he	found	insufficient	evidence	from	which	he	could	infer	a	common	intention	to	vary	the	shares,	and	he	seemingly	felt	unable	to	impute	such	an	intention.	Even	the	combination	of	the	passage	of	time,	Mr	Kernott’s	alternative	accommodation	and	Ms	Jones’	payment	of	outgoings	could	not	displace	those	original	beneficial	entitlements.	The	most	he	could	find	was	“an	agreement	by	the	appellant	to	defer	re-	alisation	for	a	number	of	years”	(at	[62]),	which	actually	crystalised	the	50%	shares.	Despite	his	earlier	conclusion	on	Oxley,	Wall	L.J.	held	that	there	was	“no	tension”	between	Oxley	and	Stack	in	their	application	to	the	facts	of	Jones	because	of	the	transfer	into	joint	names	(at	[59]).	 In	his	concurring	but	firmer	judgment,	Rimer	L.J.	offered	an	eloquent	critique	of	the	majority’s	approach	in	Stack.	He	considered	the	process	of	imputing	an	intention	inconsistent	with	Baroness	Hale’s	“emphasis	that	the	burden	of	rebutting	the	presumed	joint	beneficial	interest	is	heavy”	and	would	rarely	be	discharged	(at	[77]).	Rimer	L.J.	was	therefore	forced	to	conclude	that	the	majority	in	Stack	did	not	allow	intentions	to	be	imputed	rather	than	inferred.	Like	Wall	L.J.,	he	found	no	basis	on	which	the	judge	could	properly	decide	that	the	par-	ties	intended	their	shares	to	vary	after	separation.	Moreover,	he	re-	jected	any	suggestion	(following	Stack)	that	the	
judge	could	simply	impose	a	solution	that	he	considered	“fair”	even	where	evidence	of	the	parties’	true	common	intention	was	sparse.	 Jacob	L.J.	briefly	dissented.	Although	he	acknowledged	that	Judge	Dedman	had	referred	to	deciding	what	was	“fair	and	just”,	Jacob	L.J.	observed	that	the	remark	was	made	amongst	repeated	references	to	the	importance	of	discerning	the	parties’	intentions.	Since	the	judge	had	therefore	applied	the	correct	test	and	reached	a	conclusion	that	was	not	perverse,	Jacob	L.J.	found	no	basis	for	interference.	 All	of	the	judges	deciding	Jones	could	be	criticised	for	referring	too	often	to	Oxley	given	the	House	of	Lords’	apparent	attempt	to	refine	its	approach.	But	the	differing	conclusions	they	reached	to	an	extent	re-	flect	contradictions	inherent	in	Stack.	While	the	County	Court	and	High	Court	judges	were	content	to	consider	the	myriad	factors	that	might	be	relevant	in	discerning	the	parties’	true	common	intention	and	the	possibility	of	imputing	to	them	an	intention	based	on	what	is	fair,	the	majority	of	the	Court	of	Appeal	were	conclusively	influenced	by	the	strong	presumption	that	equity	follows	the	law	and	the	rejection	of	an	approach	based	on	fairness	alone.	 Wall	L.J.	issued	a	familiar	and	justifiable	plea	to	cohabitants	and	their	legal	advisors	to	“address	the	unthinkable”,	i.e.	to	“address	their	minds	to	the	size	and	fate	of	the	respective	beneficial	interests	on	ac-	quisition,	separation	and	thereafter”	(at	[61]).	Nevertheless,	it	is	equally	appropriate	to	plead	that	the	Supreme	Court,	when	it	hears	Jones,	clarifies	the	correct	approach	where	evidence	of	a	common	intention	is	equivocal	at	best.	 BRIAN	SLOAN	 	
